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The Space Between Second-Personal Respect and Rational Care in Theory and Mental 
Health Law 
 
*Published in Law and Philosophy (2015) 34: 433±467  
 
In recent years human rights and statutory instruments have extended the right of 
autonomy to disabled individuals ± a group which has been marginalised historically both in 
liberal theory and politics.  The UN Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) 
recognises the equal moral and legal standing of individuals with disabilities in relation to others ± 
to have the right of self-determination and to demand respect for their dignity as persons.  This 
human rights ideal has been formally realised (albeit imperfectly) in the Mental Capacity Act of 
2005 in England and Wales (MCA),1 of which, amongst its numerous objectivesLVWRµHPSRZHU
SHRSOH WR PDNH GHFLVLRQV IRU WKHPVHOYHV ZKHUHYHU SRVVLEOH¶2 and ensure that medical 
professionals, care providers, and family members treat disabled individuals with the presumption 
of capacity.3  The MCA encourages decisional capacity in two ways: firstly, a greater number of 
individuals compared to previously will be judged to have capacity through the application of a 
functional test that is both time- and issue-specific.  Secondly, even if best interests decisions are 
to be made with a finding of incapacity, DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQ, and consideration of their 
feelings, beliefs, and values, are to be encouraged.4  This paper examines the implications of 
Stephen 'DUZDOO¶V LPSRUWDnt discussion of the second-person standpoint and rational care in 
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 For more on the debate about the contested compliance of the MCA to the CRPDVHH3HWHU%DUWOHWWµ7KH
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 Lord Falconer, forward, Mental Capacity Act 2005 Code of Practice (London: TSO, 2007). 
3
 This is only one of a number of other objectives, as what is to be done when a person lacks capacity is a 
large part of the statute.   
4
 MCA 2005 4(4), (6). 
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conjunction with developments in mental capacity law.  'DUZDOO¶Vdistinctive version of Kantian 
contractualism has already been identified as a viable justification for both moral and standalone 
legal obligations resulting from second-personal address.5  On one hand, the second-person 
standpoint captures well the normative perspective underlying the legal recognition of persons 
with disabilities, who are now presumed to have equal standing with non-disabled individuals and 
therefore possess the second-personal authority to demand certain treatment and respect from 
others.  Deference to their personal choices is required accordingly.   
On the other hand, the contractualist underpinning of second-personal respect presupposes 
both interacting parties have equal psychological capacities to enter into relations of reciprocity 
and moral responsibility.  'DUZDOO¶V theory arguably provides justification for the differential legal 
treatment of individuals depending on their mental capacity, whereby third-personal, welfarist 
considerations determine the good for those lacking psychological competencies under a 
framework of rational care.6  Judicial practice has tended to deploy standards similar to Darwall 
with some worrying results. 
This paper argues that, whilst 'DUZDOO¶VWKHRU\ULJKWO\VWUHVVHVWKHUHODWLRQDOIUDPHZRUNRI
moral obligations, difficult theoretical contortions are required to accommodate the moral intuition 
± of which innovative legal mechanisms increasingly recognise ± that second-personal respect is 
owed to individuals with diminished psychological competencies.  Like other contractualists, 
'DUZDOO¶V SRVLWLYH DFFRXQW RI PRUDOLW\ UHVWV RQ D FORVH FRQFHSWXDO WLH EHWZHHQ SV\FKRORJLFDO
competence and respect for dignity.  Whether successful or unsuccessful in their theoretical 
endeavours to separate these two concepts, the results tend to distort or neglect aspects of our 
second-personal engagement in conditions of vulnerability, dependence, and impairment. 
                                                     
5
 Symposium: The Second-Person Standpoint and the Law in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 40:3 
(2007): 6WHSKHQ 'DUZDOO µ/DZ DQG WKH 6HFRQG-3HUVRQ 6WDQGSRLQW¶ SS -910; Gideon Yaffe, 
µ5HDVRQDEOHQHVVLQWKH/DZDQG6HFRQG-3HUVRQDO$GGUHVV¶SS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Second-Person Standpoint¶SS-1010.  Robin Kar argues that the law is essentially second-personal in, 
µ+DUW¶V5HVSRQVHWR([FOXVLYH/HJDO3RVLWLYLVP¶Georgetown Law Journal 92 (2006-7): 393-462.   
6
 Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability (Cambridge: 
Harvard UP, 2006), p. 128, abbreviated to SPS hereafter. 
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To meet this challenge, inspiration can be drawn from virtue ethics critiques of the rights- 
and capacities-based focus in contemporary moral theorising.  I argue that respect needs to be 
understood differently, grounded in broader notions of human flourishing rather than conditions of 
psychological competence.  I forward a notion of competence that (i) embeds second-personal 
recognition within asymmetrical, non-reciprocal relationships; and (ii) is fuelled by the 
motivational intersection of rational care and second-personal respect.  Thus, second-personal 
respect is essential even in best interests decision-making on behalf of incapacitous patients.  
Section I outlines DaUZDOO¶V DFFRXQW RI VHFRQG-personal respect and rational care.  Though his 
framework can partially capture the phenomena in legal practice, Section II suggests that the 
overly demanding psychological competence presupposed in respect for dignity may justify 
unwarranted best interests judgements on behalf of individuals.  Further examination of 6FDQORQ¶V
version of Kantian contractualism reveals the philosophical manoeuvring required to resist the 
differential treatment of individuals based on diminished psychological competence.  Section III 
suggests that the concept of hermeneutic competence can help articulate the second-personal 
respect owed to individuals even in situations of inequality, asymmetry, and non-reciprocity.  The 
import of this alternative account will then be discussed in relation to the judicial practice of best 
interest decision-making and the legal concept of mental capacity. 
 
I.  
 Darwall grounds obligations of right in the second-personal standpoint in order to provide 
a contractualist answer to sceptical questions surrounding moral normativity.  Morality has a 
second-personal structure, in that moral norms and principles are generated through second-
personal address.  The second-person standpoint expresses a moral perspective and relation 
between individuals which is obtained once an explicit claim is issued from one to another: one 
can hold another accountable for her conduct due to the fact that she holds herself to have 
authoritative reasons which another ought to adhere to and respect.  Darwall uses the example of 
WKHGHPDQGWRVWRSVWHSSLQJRQVRPHRQH¶VIRRWZHOIDULVWUHDVRQVPLJKWSURYLGHUHDVRQVIRUPHWR
take my foot off yours (to stop the physical pain), but these cannot ground an authoritative 
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demand.  Rather, the normativity of the demand stems from the second-SHUVRQDO µULJKW W\SHRI
UHDVRQ¶GHPDQGLQJP\FRPSOLDQFHWRUHVSHFW\RXUFODLPWRKDYH\RXUIRRWIUHHRIPLQHSecond-
personal address presupposes additional normative concepts, such as second-personal competence, 
mutual reciprocity, and equal accountability.  Heteronomous considerations (i.e. subjective 
preferences to observe or disregard DQRWKHU¶V demand) cannot dictate second-personal reasons, nor 
motivate relations of mutual accountability.  Authoritative second-personal address requires 
hypothetical endorsement from the idealised standpoint of mutually accountable, free and equal 
agents. 
Recognition of authoritative second-personal address therefore presumes the possession of 
psychological or second-personal competence.  This requires an autonomous will in the Kantian 
sense which expresses itself through WKH FDSDFLW\ IRU µVRPH IRUP RI PRUDO UHDVRQLQJ OLNH WKH
FDWHJRULFDOLPSHUDWLYH¶.7  Maxims are motivated by normative principles that can be hypothetically 
agreed upon under ideal contractualist conditions rather than a particular outcome or state.  When 
you make a demand or claim on me, you assume I am second-personally competent ± that I am 
DEOH WRXQGHUJR WKHSURFHVVRIQRUPDWLYHµXSWDNH¶so that I autonomously recognise the force of 
your reasons from the perspective of a free and rational person, within a community of mutually 
accountable equals.  Without this uptake, these demands would violate the freedom of the 
addressee and veer towards coercion; respect for the autonomy of the addressee is thus embedded 
in the condition of second-personal competence.  
'DUZDOO¶VFRQWUDFWXDOLVWIUDPHZRUNGHPDQGVWKDWWKHFRPSHWHQF\FRQGLWLRQEHDSSOLFDEOH
to both addresser and addressee, partly to sidestep worries that individuals will excuse themselves 
from taking responsibility.8  Second-personal authority is therefore a derivative of second-personal 
competence.  Issuing a second-personal demand assumes WKH µIUHH DJHQF\ RI DGGUHVVHU DQG
DGGUHVVHH¶ ± both have equal law-giving and law-executing powers in a moral community, and 
thereby the equal ability to act on second-personal reasons.9  Our mutual accountability to shared 
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 Ibid., p. 154. 
8
 A point Stephen Darwall has emphasised in response to my paper.   
9
 Ibid., p. 256. 
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moral norms is further implied when the addressee is held responsible and blamed for her for non-
compliance.  By µGHPDQGLQJFRPSOLDQFH¶WKHOHJLWLPDWHDXWKRULW\WRUHODWHWRWKHDGGUHVVHHDVVXFK 
is presumed.10  Darwall states µ>R@QO\ EHFDXVH ZH FDQ DVVXPH WKDW ZH HDFK FDQ WDNH XS WKH
standpoint of one among others, determine what demands it makes sense to hold one another to 
from this perspective, and then to address these demands to one another and to ourselves can be 
VHQVLEO\ DFWXDOO\ KROG HDFK RWKHU WR WKHVH GHPDQGV¶11  For second-personal address to be 
authoritative, therefore, requires both addressee and addresser to possess second-personal 
competence.12  
Whether the voluntary normative uptake that is necessary for respecting a second-personal 
GHPDQGLVDOVRQHFHVVDU\WRUHVSHFWDQLQGLYLGXDO¶Vdignity is ambiguous.  On one hand, Darwall 
implies that respect for dignity is a non-voluntary and necessary condition for all second-personal 
interaction ± namely dignity as a presuppositional and non-relational thesis: 
 
D1: Respect for the equal and inviolable dignity of persons is presupposed in any second-personal 
address to demand certain treatment.   
 
On this reading, all individuals possess the dignity of persons; it cannot be disrupted by 
psychological incapacities which LPSHGH DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V VHFRQG-personal competence and 
authority.  Equal dignity of persons entails recognition UHVSHFW IRURQH¶V FDSDFLW\ IRUPRUDODQG
autonomous rational agency, and is a non-contingent moral obligation.  By contrast, dignity that is 
based on appraisal respect is conferred to a person due to her character, conduct, or 
achievements,13 and is contingent RQ DQRWKHU¶V YROXQWDU\ UHFRJQLWLRQ  'DUZDOO¶V FULWLTXH RI
)LFKWH¶Vassumption that recognition of SHUVRQV¶dignity results from voluntary choice supports the 
                                                     
10
 Ibid., p. 259. 
11
 'DUZDOOµ7KH9DOXHRI$XWRQRP\DQG$XWRQRP\RIWKH:LOO¶Ethics 116 (2006): 284. 
12
 SPS, p. 119. 
13
 Ibid., p. 123. 
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D1 reading.14  He claims, µUHVSHFW IRU RQH¶V GLJQLW\ LV VRPHWKLQJ DQ\RQH FDQ GHPDQG¶15 and 
µ>H@TXDOGLJQLW\ LVQRWKLQJDQ\RQHFDQEHVWRZVRQHLWKHULV LWDQ\WKLQJDQ\SHUVRQRUJURXSFDQ
UHPRYHWKURXJKGLVUHVSHFW¶16  On D1, respect for dignity can be demanded irrespective of whether 
DQLQGLYLGXDO¶Vcapacity for moral agency is fully realised, although the second-personal response 
to the demand need not be coextensive with respect for subjective choice.   
Yet, other textual passages imply dignity as a conditional and relational thesis: 
 
D2: Respect for the equal and inviolable dignity of persons is necessary in authoritative second-
personal address issued by second-personally competent agents. 
 
On this interpretation, second-personal competence confers the authority to demand respect for 
RQH¶VGLJQLW\, mainly because such respect is coextensive with respect for autonomy.  Respect for 
autonomy rests on recognising persons as µVHOf-authenticating sources of valid claims'¶17 ± or for 
their standing to demand that others act on principles that can be collectively legislated from a free 
and reasonable standpoint.  5HVSHFW IRUDSHUVRQ¶VGLJQLW\ thus UHTXLUHVµUHVSRQVLYHQHVVWRZKDW
someone can claim by virtue of being an agent with second-SHUVRQDOFRPSHWHQFH¶18, and implies 
WKHRYHUULGLQJDXWKRULW\RIDQRWKHU¶s second-personal claims, expressed usually through deference 
to their subjective preferences and values.  The condition of equal psychological competence is 
therefore embedded in UHVSHFW IRURQH¶VGLJQLW\ DV µ>W@KHGLJQLW\RISHUVRQV >«@ LV WKH VHFRQG-
personal authority of an equal: the standing to make claims and demands of one another as equal 
and rational agents, including as a member of a community of mutually accountable equDOV¶19   
Conversely, when an individual is said to lack second-personal competence, their inability to issue 
                                                     
14
 'DUZDOO µ)LFKWH DQG WKH 6HFRQG-3HUVRQ 6WDQGSRLQW¶ International Yearbook for German Idealism 3 
(2005): 91-2ZHQ:DUHµ)LFKWH¶V9ROXQWDULVP¶European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2009): 262-82. 
15
 SPS, p. 128. 
16
 Ibid., p. 144. 
17
 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia UP, 2005) p. 32. 
18
 SPS, p. 127. 
19
 Ibid., p. 121. 
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an authoritative demand means they cannot demand respect for their right of autonomy.  On D2, 
respectLQJDQRWKHU¶V dignity is conditional on parties possessing equal psychological competence 
and will entail respecting RQH¶V autonomy and constitutive choices. 
 These two readings clearly pull in different directions.  On D1, dignity is part and parcel 
of being a person.  On D2, dignity presupposes the presence of certain psychological capacities so 
that conditions of mutual and reciprocal accountability are met.  Darwall¶V discussion of the role of 
trustees might initially lend further support for D1.  Though KH LV µbound to insist that moral 
obligation, like the concept of a right, cannot be understood independently of authoritative 
GHPDQGV¶, he suggests that those lacking second-personal competence can demand certain 
treatment, rights, or compensation through trustees.20  Second-personal authority can therefore be 
separated from second-personal competence, so those with deficient capacities still have the 
authority to make a second-personal claim, even if it is outsourced to trustees.   
Yet whether Darwall is entitled to make this philosophical move is dubious given how 
second-personal competence is embedded within the interdefinable circle of normative concepts, 
such as second-personal authority, equality, and autonomy.21  Textual evidence points to a 
conceptual link EHWZHHQUHVSHFWLQJDSHUVRQ¶VDXWRQRP\DQGUHVSHFWIRUGLJQLW\, thus committing 
Darwall to a version of D2.  If equal dignity demands respect for RQH¶VDXWRQRP\ and constitutive 
choices, this can apply only in the presence of second-personal competence to issue such demands.  
Darwall would deny the claim WKDW WKH ULJKW WR µOHDG RQH¶V RZQ OLIH¶ FDQ EH H[HUFLVHG ZLWKRXW
moral responsibility, irrespective of its effect on others.  Certain rational and moral capacities are 
needed in order to regulate our conduct in accordance with principles that reflect the common 
agreement of free and reasonable persons2QEDODQFH'DUZDOO¶VDFFRXQWRIGLJQLW\DPRXQWVWRD
µYROXQWDULVWLF DFFRXQW RI ZKDW LW LV IRU KXPDQ EHLQJV WR EH HQGV LQ WKHPVHOYHV¶22  This 
                                                     
20
 Ibid., p. 29. 
21
 'DUZDOO µ:K\.DQW1HHGV WKH6HFRQG-SHUVRQ6WDQGSRLQW¶ LQ7KRPDV+LOO-UThe Blackwell Guide to 
.DQW¶V(WKics (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), p. 144. 
22
 Michael Rosen, Dignity; Its History and Meaning (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2012), p. 89. 
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voluntaristism manifests itself, not in that choice (however arbitrary or subjective) is valued writ 
large, but in that human beings can make principled, norm-responsive choices.23 
Paternalistic welfarist judgements can made on behalf of those lacking these psychological 
competencies, as parallel to respect is a moral framework of rational care.  Whereas agent-
regarding and agent-relative reasons ground respect and µUHJXODWHRXUconduct in relation to her ± 
WR GR ZKDW LV FDOOHG IRU E\ KHU GLJQLW\¶, rational care is groundHG RQ µWKLUG-personal, welfare-
regarding, and agenWQHXWUDO¶UHDVRQVVXEMHFWWRWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRIµV\PSDWKHWLFFRQFHUQ¶24  Care 
LQYROYHVSURPRWLQJFHUWDLQVWDWHVQDPHO\µZKDWRQHEHOLHYHVZRXOGUHDOO\EHQHILW¶KHU¶DQGLVin 
her good.25  These judgements and aQDJHQW¶VSUHIHUHQFHVmay overlap incidentally, as the latter 
are µIHDWXUHV RI WKH object of concern, rather than partially defining the perspective of practical 
MXGJPHQW LWVHOI¶26  AQ DJHQW¶V SUHIHUHQFHV DUH considered but are not determinative; an agent-
neutral deliberative standpoint takes precedence.27  Different phases of a parent-child relationship 
illustrate tKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQUHVSHFWDQGFDUH$WRGGOHU¶VDYHUVLRQWREURFFROLDQGSUHIHUHQFH
for candy carries no normative weight for a caring parent, insofar as she believes eating vegetables 
would be more beneficial for her toddler.  By contrast, WKHFKLOG¶VSUHIHUHQFHVKDYH independent 
weight once she develops as a competent individual; the parent can no longer subject her to the 
paternalistic treatment that was appropriate previously.28  This suggests that the transition from 
care to respect is contingent on individuals meeting a certain competency threshold before respect 
for their inherent dignity demands respect for their subjective choices within certain limits.  By 
default, Darwall is not entitled to make the opposite claim ± that persons who lack second-
personal competence still have inherent dignity given that best interests judgements can 
legitimately override their choices.   




 SPS, p.128. 
25




 DDUZDOOµ5HSO\WR*ULIILQ5D]DQG:ROI¶Utilitas 18 (2006): 444. 
28
 Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care, p. 15. 
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One might argue that theUHLVQRµHLWKHU-RU¶ dynamic between respect and care.  Darwall 
recognises that these two tracks of respect and care may bleed into one another, particularly in 
reciprocal friendships and intimate love relations.  Yet such intersections seem to apply only when 
both parties possess the second-personal competence needed to enter into relations of mutual 
accountability.29  Even then, one particular way of valuing an individual tends to win out over the 
other.  Imagine a wife sees her husband engaging in increasingly extreme sports and he demands 
she respect his choice.  Second-personal claims and third-personal reasons both motivate her 
request for him to stop: she might be fed up with how much time and money he devotes to these 
extreme sports, but equally, she might be worried about the risk to his body and life.  His second-
personal competence, however, third-personal rational concern is subsumed under her second-
personal claims, meaning that she cannot choose a course of action for him against his will, 
forcing him to stop these freely-chosen activities.  Special normative status must be given to his 
voluntary choices.  But imagine this scenario with her 15-year old son.  The same conflicting 
motivations are present, but unlike before, she could choose a course of action for him against his 
choices primarily because her VRQ¶VVHFRQG-personal competence to enter into relations of mutual 
accountability is likely not the same level as her KXVEDQG¶V Even where intersections between 
respect and care exist, the simultaneous adoption of second- and third-personal standpoints is 
conceptually impossible, particularly since 'DUZDOO¶V second-personal standpoint RULHQWDWHVRQH¶V
conduct solely around the demands of another.  The competency levels of the individual will 
ultimately dictate which standpoint is morally appropriate.   
To salvage the D1 reading, Darwall could claim that equal dignity subsumes both third-
personal rational care and second-personal respect for autonomy.  But with this move, the concept 
of dignity becomes more ambiguous LQ'DUZDOO¶Vpicture.  For Kantian constructivists, dignity is 
associated with the capacity to engage in autonomous agency, characteristic of persons who 
                                                     
29
 µ>5@HODWLRQVKLSV RI PXWXDO FRQFHUQ at least between those with second-personal competence >«@ also 
LQYROYHDQHOHPHQWRIUHVSHFWRISDUWRIZKDWLWLVWRUHODWHWRWKHRWKHULQWKDWGLVWLQFWLYHFDULQJZD\¶SPS, 
p. 126, n. 11, emphasis added. 
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constrain themselves in accordance with mutually agreed upon principles.30  By contrast, D1 
weakens the conceptual link between autonomy and dignity, and demands a concept of the latter 
that is broad and abstract enough to encompass situations where autonomy need not be respected.  
A status-based view, for example, posits that dignity is an inviolable core one possesses by virtue 
of species PHPEHUVKLS'HSHQGLQJRQKRZµKXPDQity¶ is defined, the ability to engage in a type 
of autonomous rational agency need not be a condition for equal dignity, as seen in Catholic 
arguments surrounding the status of embryos and foetuses.  Dignity as defined by the capacity for 
moral autonomy therefore reflects only one contested view.  Even so, textual support for a status-
based account of dignity is absent in Darwall, and it is unlikely that he would endorse separating 
the normative concept of dignity from capacities for moral responsibility and autonomous agency.   
 
II.  
'DUZDOO¶Vcontractualist theory can provide a useful interpretive lens for understanding the 
normative perspective underlying legal demands for the equal treatment of and respect for persons 
ZLWK GLVDELOLWLHV  )LUVW OHJDO LQVWUXPHQWV DUH LQFUHDVLQJO\ UHFRJQLVLQJ WKH µVHFRQG-personal 
DXWKRULW\¶ RI SHUVRQV ZLWK GLVDELOLWLHV SDUWLFXODUO\ DV H[SUHVVHG LQ the presumption of their 
capacity to make independent decisions about their care, treatment, and living arrangements.  
Under the CRPD, µSHUVRQV ZLWK GLVDELOLWLHV HQMR\ HTXDO OHJDO FDSDFLW\ YLV-à-vis others in all 
DVSHFWV RI OLIH¶ ZKLFK PHDQV WKDW WKHLU µULJKWV ZLOO DQG SUHIHUHQFHV¶ DUH WR EH IXQGDPHQWDOO\
respected.31  'LVDEOHG LQGLYLGXDOV DFFRUGLQJO\ KDYH µWKH VWDQGLQJ WR GHPDQG FRPSOLDQFH¶ ± to 
demand respect for their right to self-determination and dignity, as well as hold others accountable 
for the treatment they receive.32   
Second, 'DUZDOO¶V GLYLVLRQ EHWZHHQ ¶UHVSHFW¶ DQG µFDUH¶ provides plausible justification 
for the differential treatment of individuals in legal practice.  The MCA states that should one fail 
the test of capacity third parties can make a best interest decision on DQRWKHU¶Vbehalf.  Like in 
                                                     
30
 Cf, Oliver Sensen, µ.DQW¶V&RQFHSWLRQRI+XPDQ'LJQLW\¶Kant-Studien 100 (2009): 309-31. 
31
 CRPD Art. 12(4).  
32
 SPS, p. 14. 
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'DUZDOO¶VDFFRXQWRIUDWLRQDOFDUHlegal applications of the best interests standard demonstrate that 
the wishes and values of the individual can be outweighed by circumstantial or objective 
considerations, and therefore have no special intrinsic weight from a pre-MCA, or indeed, post-
MCA perspective.33  5HVSHFWIRURQH¶VDXWRQRP\LVWKHdefault value with a finding of capacity; if 
otherwise, welfare as determined from an agent-neutral perspective takes precedence.34  
Third, even as the criteria of mental capacity and second-personal competence are not 
directly coextensive, 'DUZDOO¶VWKHRU\SURYLGHs unique insight into the normative state of play in 
those legal judgements which appreciate how the realisation of individual rights turns on the 
second-personal recognition of RQH¶V authoritative address.35  At times the courts have sought to 
negate the protective impulses of care providers who have failed to recognise D FDUH UHFLSLHQW¶V 
second-personal authority and right to autonomy.  For example, the case KK v. STCC [2012]36 
concerned the mental capacity of an 82-\HDU ROG ZRPDQ ZLWK 3DUNLQVRQ¶V GLVHDVH YDVFXODU
dementia, and hemiplegia to make decisions regarding her living arrangements and care.  A 
finding of mental incapacity led to her residency at a care home, but the patient wished to return to 
her own home and challenged the mental capacity assessment.37  Baker J stated WKDWWKHUHZDVµD
danger that professionals, including judges, may objectively conflate a capacity assessment with a 
EHVWLQWHUHVWDQDO\VLV¶DQGKHUHLWHUDWHGµWKHFDUGLQDOUXOHHQVKULQHGLQVWDWXWHWKDWSHUVRQis not to 
be treated as unable to make a decision merely because she makes what is perceived as being an 
unwise one.¶38  He concluded that the presumption of capacity had not been overturned.  Quoting 
Munby LJ, he argued that well-intentioned VWDWH LQWHUYHQWLRQµcan itself end up being abusive of 
                                                     
33
 This ambiguity is embedded within the MCA Code of Practice paras. 5.37-55. ITW v Z [2009] EWHC 
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KHUGLJQLW\KHUKDSSLQHVVDQGLQGHHGRIKHUKXPDQULJKWV¶39  The local authority may have had 
good welfarist UHDVRQVIRURYHUULGLQJ..¶VZLVKHV Yet she was owed respect for her decision, 
however unwise, risky, or potentially harmful, given her psychological competence to enter into a 
mutually accountable relationship.  This case provides a concrete illustration of the moral wrong 
ZKLFKUHVXOWVIURPGLVUHJDUGIRUDSDWLHQW¶VOHJLWLPDWHVHFRQG-personal authority.   
Darwall¶V contractualist theory therefore provides justification for the legal practice of 
linking certain psychological competencies to the second-personal authority to make overriding 
claims within certain limits.  However, problems emerge once we probe the close conceptual link 
between second-personal competence, binding second-personal address, and respect for RQH¶V 
dignity.  Consider the case of a severely anorexic woman, E, who was forced to undergo life-
sustaining treatment against her wishes.40  This judgement was controversial because: (i) it 
overturned two advance decisions against force-feeding and life support; (ii) the treatment itself 
posed high risks of physical trauma and potential death, and the possibility of recovery was very 
small; (iii) the treatment of force-feeding recreated the trauma of sexual abuse; (iv) the judgement 
overruled the views of those treating her who had concluded her autonomy should be respected.  A 
finding of mental incapacity overturned both advance and present decisions against treatment, 
subsequently initiating a best interests decision-making framework.   
This case poses difficult questions about the theoretical contortions contractualism has to 
undergo in order to accommodate the moral intuition that individuals with cognitive impairments 
could make authoritative claims on others.  The questionable rational capabilities of individuals 
with anorexia nervosa are already a source of contentious debate.41  The judge in this case concurs 
                                                     
39
 µ6DIHJXDUGLQJ DQG 'LJQLW\ 3URWHFWLQJ /LEHUWLHV ± :KHQ LV 6DIHJXDUGLQJ $EXVH"¶ Brunswick Mental 
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7KH ,PSRUWDQFHRI3UHMXGLFH DQG'LDORJXH LQ A Local Authority v E and Ors¶
Child and Family Law Quarterly 26:2 (2014).  
41
 -7DQHWDO µ&RPSHWHQFH WR5HIXVH7UHDWPHQW LQ$QRUH[LD1HUYRVD¶ International Journal of Law and 
Psychiatry 26 (2003): 697-707; +HDWKHU 'UDSHU µ$QRUH[LD 1HUYRVD DQG 5HVSHFWLQJ D 5HIXVDO RI /LIH-
3URORQJLQJ7KHUDS\$/LPLWHG-XVWLILFDWLRQ¶Bioethics 14 (2000): 120-33; Margery Gans and Willam Gunn 
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with legal precedent which clearly characterises the disorder as a compulsion rather than 
expressive of free or rational deliberation.42  Yet rationality and reasonableness need not imply the 
same thing: perhaps the debate about the decisional capacity of E focuses more on her 
instrumental rationality, whilst for Darwall, her second-personal competence might remain intact 
because of her reasonableness.  Although there are arguments that the decision-making 
characteristic of eating disorders has its own internal principled logic, consistency, and rationality, 
this is not what I understand Darwall to mean with WKH LGHDORI µUHDVRQDEOHQHVV¶ This standard 
implies, rather, the moral ability to practically reason in accordance with a second-personal 
version of the categorical imperative.  The µFRQVWUDLQWRI UHDVRQDEOHQHVV¶ VXEMHFWVGHPDQGV WR D 
test of reasonable rejection for µ[the addresser] must be able to expect their addressees to accept, or 
not reasonably to reject, their demands as free and rational persons, in light of their interest as 
independent, mutually accountable, (second-SHUVRQDOO\FRPSHWHQWDJHQWV¶43  
The pressing question then LVZKHWKHU(¶V VHFRQG-personal claim expresses moral rather 
than mere rational competency.  Through her advance decisions, E could be understood as making 
the second-SHUVRQDO GHPDQG µ5HVSHFW P\ IUHHGRP WR EH FRPSXOVLYHO\ JXLGHG¶.  Her own 
accountability under this particular normative demand might not be the problem, but rather 
whether her addressee can (i) accept the content of such a principle as a free and rational person, 
and (ii) assume that the demand issues from an equally responsible agent.  On the face of it, 
Darwall might argue that deference to E¶VGHPDQG is justified so long as the maxim reflects her 
evaluation of the different factors and psychological harms surrounding treatment.  However, if 
the decision derives directly from her compulsion ± the more common medico-juridical 
interpretation of treatment refusals by eating disorder patients ± 'DUZDOO¶VSRVLWLRQEHFRPHVPRUH
complicated.  The single-minded DQGFRPSXOVLYHQDWXUHRI(¶VVHFRQG-personal demand makes it 
unlikely that the treatment decisions of someone in the grips of severe anorexia reflects full 
                                                                                                                                                               
-U µEnd stage anorexLD &ULWHULD IRU FRPSHWHQFH WR UHIXVH WUHDWPHQW¶ International Journal of Law and 
Psychiatry 26 (2003): 677±695 
42
 A Local Authority v E and Ors, para. 29; 5H : $ 0LQRU 0HGLFDO 7UHDWPHQW &RXUW¶V -XULVGLFWLRQ 
[1992] 3 WLR 758 
43
 SPS, p. 320. 
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accountability, or satisfies WKH FRQGLWLRQV RI IUHHGRP DQG UHDVRQDEOHQHVV LQ 'DUZDOO¶V VHQVH  
Darwall might agree that the legal ILQGLQJRI(¶VLQFDSDFLW\Dnd move to best interests decision-
making was invalid, yet to render a dissimilar conclusion according to his contractualist 
framework would require some difficult philosophical manoeuvring, given that his basic starting 
points likewise sanction the differential treatment of individuals depending on their psychological 
capacities.   
We might infer from the fact that rational capacity and second-personal competence can 
come apart in this way that the moral failings of the severely anorexic individual are essentially the 
same as that of a psychopath.  This conclusion, however, is inattentive to the complex 
phenomenology of moral incompetence in such circumstances.  Rational capacity often implies 
nominal standards of transitivity and consistency.  As most patients with eating disorders score 
highly on competency tests that are based on these standards, it is plausible that refusals of 
treatment demonstrate rational capacity.44  Equally possible is a simultaneous lack of moral, 
second-personal competence, in the sense that such a patient can hear and receive, yet cannot 
actively respond to DQRWKHU SHUVRQ¶V VHFRQG-personal demands in relation to the interpersonal 
harms caused by her compulsive disorder.  Her second-personal competence may be intact when 
other sorts of demands are issued to her, though the all-encompassing nature of anorexia nervosa 
as a disorder makes it likely that responsiveness to these claims is similarly compromised.  
Second-personal competence by its very definition refers to a kind of moral standpoint which 
HQDEOHVRQHWRVXEMHFWDQGFRQWURORQHVHOILQWKHIDFHRIDQRWKHU¶VGHPDQG± to put aside our own 
heteronomous motivation and respond to the normative force of second-personal reasons.  It 
requires, not a superficial moral awareness that may or may not move an individual depending on 
their subjective whims, but a deeper kind of recognition that has categorical normative and 
motivational force.  Different causes instigate the recognitional failure in these two examples: the 
psychopathic individual does not care about or acknowledge the normative force of second-
personal reasons.  The person with severe anorexia nervosa may emotionally care but the 




compulsiveness of the disorder means these reasons lack motivational grip.  That recognitional 
failure occurs in both the psychopath and the severely anorexic individual; therefore they need not 
imply that both their moral failings and second-personal incompetence are coextensive, and by 
implication, that both should be held responsible in the same way for such shortcomings. 
To avoid the conclusion that a best interests judgement could be sanctioned in this case, 
we might suggest that the competency conditions have more to do with whether or not we can hold 
an individual responsible for responding appropriately to our reactive attitudes.  7KHDGGUHVVHU¶V
own second-personal incompetence would not bear on her second-personal authority to demand 
respect for her choices.  But I discussed above why this more minimal claim is unsupported 
without considerable philosophical manoeuvring on Darwall¶VSDUW+e argues: µin the reciprocal 
recognition of the second-person standpoint, addresser and addressee are committed alike to their 
mutual accountability.  >«@  It commits them both to imposing not demands on others that they 
would not also be prepared to impose upon themselves from a common standpoint they share as 
free and rational.¶45  To make PRUDOGHPDQGVZHµhold ourselves and one another accountable¶
DQG µfunction as equal law-executing or law-HQIRUFLQJ PHPEHUVRI WKHPRUDOFRPPXQLW\¶46  In 
other words, asserting second-personal demands within a moral community presupposes both can 
engage in a form of second-personal, practical deliberation that is characteristic of free and 
reasonable persons.  These conditions of freedom and reasonableness are closely intertwined with 
the presuppositions of reciprocity and mutually accountability, where the addresser must likewise 
SRVVHVVµWKHSV\FKRORJLFDOFDSDFLWLHVQHFHVVDU\WRKROGKHUVHOIUHVSRQVLEOHDQGHQWHULQWRUHODWLRQV
RI PXWXDO DFFRXQWDELOLW\¶47  Both, not just one, must satisfy the conditions of free and rational 
agency.  At least from an ideal contractualist standpoint, the competency conditions cannot be 
applied unilaterally, given that reciprocity is a necessary feature of membership within the type of 
moral community which situates valid second-personal demands.   
                                                     
45
 SPS, p. 320, emphases added. 
46
 Ibid., p. 307, emphasis added.   
47
 4XRWHGLQ0DWWKHZ6PLWKµ,QWHUYLHZZLWK'DUZDOO¶The Yale Philosophy Review 4 (2008): 71. 
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One might contend that DarwDOO¶V normative-philosophical justification for the second-
personal source of moral obligations precludes criticisms based on empirical phenomena, like 
psychological incapacities caused by mental disorder.  Darwall states, µ>W@KHWKHVLVRIPRUDOLW\DV
equal accountability is moral-SKLORVRSKLFDO QRW SV\FKRORJLFDO¶, thus implying that the link 
between second-personal FRPSHWHQFH DQG UHVSHFW IRU D SHUVRQ¶V GLJQLW\ UHSUHVHQWs idealised 
contractualist conditions.48 8VLQJ WKLV WDFN 'DUZDOO¶V empirical examination of psychological 
mechanisms illustrates how respect for dignity functions independently of issues surrounding 
second-personal competency.  It thus supports D1 even if the normative account of equal dignity 
gestures towards D2.  How far this gets us is questionable, however.  Theories of moral obligation 
must have traction with the messy world of practical deliberation, conflict, and choice, for µSDUWRI
what is involved in having a better theory is being able more HIIHFWLYHO\WRFRSHZLWKWKHZRUOG¶49  
Also doubtful is whether Darwall would be happy to accept the incoherence between empirical 
psychology and his normative-philosophical account of authoritative second-person address in 
order to rescue the D1 thesis.  In fact, 'DUZDOO¶Vexamination of the empirical psychology behind 
the second-person points to the other direction: µWRWKHH[WHQWWKDWKXPDQEHKDYLRUFDQEHVKRZQWR
involve capacities in which second-personal moral notions are psychologically realized, so also 
can these ideas be seen to fit wLWKRXUSV\FKRORJ\RUDWOHDVWQRWWREHLQFRQIOLFWZLWKLW¶50  The 
empathetic mechanisms and psychological conflict experienced by participants within the famous 
Milgram experiments demonstrate widespread human capacities for accepting norms ± specifically 
µSULQFLSOH-GHSHQGHQW¶51 second-personal reasons.  The closer the learner was in proximity, the 
more subjects of the experiments became increasingly discomfited with inflicting shocks, thus 
revealing how empathy and norm acceptance work in tandem in the psychology behind second-
personal competence.  7KH YLFWLP¶V remonstrances and blame triggered second-personal 
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empathetic identification with the feelings tied to such norms.52  Empathetic identification with 
DQRWKHU¶V UHDFWLYH DWWLWXGHV LQVWLJDWHd the addressee to adopt a second-personal perspective on 
KHUVHOI WREHFRPH µYXOQHUDEOH¶ DQG µVXVFHSWLEOH WR DSSHDUDQFHV DV IURP WKHRWKHU¶V VWDQGSRLQW¶
and to subsequently blame or hold herself in light of this standpoint.53  For Darwall, such 
empathetic identification also signalled UHFLSURFDOUHVSHFWDQGFRRSHUDWLRQLQ3ULVRQHU¶V'LOHPPD
scenarios, whereby conversation was crucial in making explicit the implicit mutual recognition of 
HDFK SHUVRQ¶V DXWKRULW\  ,QGLYLGXDOV µUHFRJQL]H RQH DQRWKHU DV D VRXUFH of claims on their 
respective wills and conduct and not just on their beliefs, even about what would be sensible 
DFWLRQ IRU HLWKHU RU ERWK¶54  Common psychological mechanisms borne out in the experimental 
context therefore seem to reveal the instinctive mechanisms involved in holding oneself 
accountable to anotheU¶VGHPDQG, lending further support for the normative-philosophical account 
of D1.   
(YHQLIZHILQGFRQYLQFLQJ'DUZDOO¶VFODLPVWKDWKLVQRUPDWLYH-philosophical argument is 
bolstered by findings in empirical psychology, this cannot resolve the issue surrounding the 
normative status of second-personal claims issued by those who lack second-personal competence.  
Much like his normative-philosophical account, psychological mechanisms of empathy and 
recognition still rely on a notion of desert ± of whether second-personal demands are justified or 
not.  In cases where the addressee recognises that the addresser lacks the same psychological 
mechanisms, reciprocity could degenerate into mean-spiritedness (fuelled by resentment and 
returning like with like)55 or complete non-recognition  'DUZDOO¶V GLVFXVVLRQ RI Fehr and 
5RFNHQEDFK¶V 3ULVRQHU¶V 'LOHPPD experiments illustrates my point.  Apparently, cooperation 
diminishes in circumstances where sanctions are thought to be applied out of self-interest rather 
WKDQ YDOLG GHPDQGV WR KROG DQRWKHU DFFRXQWDEOH VXJJHVWLQJ WKDW µSHRSOH DUH ZLOOLQJ WR IRUHJR
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EHQHILWVRULQFXUFRVWVQRWRQO\ WRDGGUHVVMXVWLILHGGHPDQGVEXWDOVRWRGHI\XQMXVWLILHGRQHV¶.56  
OQRQHKDQGDQGDVLV'DUZDOO¶VLQWHQWLRQthis illustrates how equity and fairness matters in the 
psychology of the second-personal stance, as well as the empathetic process of normative uptake 
on behalf of the addressee.  On the other hand, it also reveals how addressees will excuse 
themselves from compliance if they cannot detect the same psychological mechanisms in the 
addresser.  Anchoring legitimate and authoritative second-personal address within conditions of 
reciprocity therefore has its dangers: if the addresser lacks empathy and recognitional 
psychological mechanisms, the addressee has neither the motivation nor reasons to treat their 
demand as meriting compliance.  Indeed, if notions of reciprocity, equity, and fairness help prompt 
those psychological mechanisms which distinguish between justified and unjustified demands, we 
UHWXUQWRZKHUHZHVWDUWHGUDWKHUWKDQOHQGVXSSRUWIRUWKH'WKHVLV'DUZDOO¶VFRQVLGHUDWLRQRI
the empirical psychology behind the second-person standpoint falls by the same hurdle as his 
normative-philosophical account.   
B\'DUZDOO¶V OLJKWVWKHQ(¶VGHPDQGWRKDYHKHUFKRLFHUHVSHFWHGQHHGQRWEHDGKHUHG
to.  He might disagree with the content, yet the form of his theory suggests that a best interests 
judgement from a third-party perspective of rational care is indeed appropriate in this case.  But is 
this outcome a consequence of 'DUZDOO¶V RYHUO\ VWULFW FRQFHSWXDO OLQN EHWZHHQ second-personal 
competence and respect for dignity, or endemic to contractualism more generally?  Much has been 
written on this debate, of which to delve into would detract from my primary focus.57  However, 
briefly considering whether a Scanlonian brand of moral contractualism is similarly afflicted 
would be worthwhile.  There are two key differences between Darwall and Scanlon.  First, in 
Scanlon, the three conditions which must be met by co-deliberates appear to be highly inclusive.  
Each must have i) a good; ii) comparative notions of what is reasonable and unreasonable to reject; 
                                                     
56
 SPS, pp. 174-5. 
57
 Cf. Eva Feder Kittay, /RYH¶V /DERU (New York: Routledge, 1999); &KULVWLH +DUWOH\ µ'LVDELOLW\ DQG
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7KHRU\¶Ethics 116 (2005): 40-76. 
 19 
and most crucially, iii) a point of view.58  The third condition rules out trustees of plants or 
inanimate objects, but is expansive enough in theory so as to include the views and claims of 
individuals who lack second-SHUVRQDOFRPSHWHQFHLQ'DUZDOO¶VVHQVHTo be a being with a point 
RIYLHZPHDQVWKDWµWKHUHEHVXFKDWKLQJDVZKDWLWLVOLNHWREHWKDWEHLQJVXFKDWKLQJDVZKDW
the world seems like to it.¶59   
Second, Scanlon¶VDFFRXQWRIPRUDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\ has no competency criteria.  Agents can 
reasonably make claims against another regardless of their level of moral psychological 
capabilities.  The scope for moral appraisal is likewise broadened: individuals who are unable to 
XQGHUVWDQGDSSUHFLDWHDQGUHDVVHVVWKHLUµMXGJHPHQW-VHQVLWLYHDWWLWXGHV¶FDQEHFULWLFLVHGIRUWKLV
failure.60  Judgement-sensitive attitudes are comprised of beliefs, evaluative attitudes, and 
dispositions that are sensitive to certain kinds of judgements, and can manifest themselves in a 
propensity towards patterns of unreflective thought.61  The contractualist circle becomes widened 
to include individuals with mental impairments as both co-deliberators and to whom moral 
responsibility can be attributed.   
Initially, this seems a promising route to ensure that even individuals who lack certain 
psychological capacities can claim the right to be treated with respect, thus correcting 'DUZDOO¶V
overly restrictive account of competency without relinquishing the contractualist framework.  But 
it remains doubtful ZKHWKHU WKHVH GLIIHUHQFHV PHDQ 6FDQORQ¶V FRQWUDFWXDOLVP OHDGs to a 
substantively different conclusion in the E case, or captures easily all aspects of second-personal 
respect owed to individuals with mental impairments.  The crux of the problem, ironically enough, 
OLHVLQ6FDQORQ¶Vmore catholic approach to competence.  2Q6FDQORQ¶VDFFRXQW an individual who 
is rationally capable (she can make judgements about reasons), yet is morally incompetent (she 
                                                     
58
 7 0 6FDQORQ µ&RQWUDFWXDOLVP DQG 8WLOLWDULDQLVP¶ LQ $PDUW\D 6HQ DQG %HUQDUG :LOOLDPV HGV
Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: CUP, 1982), pp. 113-4. 
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cannot understand, recognise, or respond to moral reasons) should be subject to moral criticism.62  
Holding a particular judgement-sensitive attitude presupposes that it can be rationally modified.  
Her attitudes are still attributable to her, even if she cannot understand or be persuaded by the 
force of moral reasons opposing them.63  Such an individual ignores the standing and values of 
others, and thus violates the mutual recognition at the heart of contractualism. 
%XW 6FDQORQ¶V DUJXPHQW FRQWUDGLFWV D FRPPRQ LQWXLWLRQ WKDW PRUDO FRPSHWHQFH LV D
precondition for moral accountability: blame is warranted only if a person is able to grasp the 
moral principles that she is thought to have violated.64  The claim that judgement-sensitive 
attitudes belong to a specific category of attitudes which are in theory sensitive to normative 
judgements, fails to establish our responsibility for them, particularly if they fall outside our full 
control.65  Indeed, the division between rational and moral competence is key to understanding 
certain disorders like anorexia nervosa.  Research has clearly shown that individuals with severe 
anorexia score well on rational measures of competence, demonstrating high levels of focus, 
rational control, attitudinal consistency, and goal directedness.  In one study, relatives commented, 
µ,GRQ¶WWKLQN>DQRUH[LD@WDNHVDZD\WKHLUPHQWDOFDSDFLW\DWDOOWRGHFLGH,WKLQNWKDWSUREDEO\
their mental capacity to decide iVKHLJKWHQHG¶$QRWKHUremarkedµVKH¶VYHU\IRFXVHGVKHNQRZV
WKHGDPDJHVKH¶VGRLQJ [and] NQRZVZKDWWKHLOOQHVVGRHVWR\RX¶66  Yet what is clearly lacking is 
effective responsiveness to moral reasons that conflict with her disorder: whilst a patient might 
have judgement-sensitive attitudes which respond to reasons which support her goal of thinness, 
there is a failure to recognise the moral reasons which would lead her to modify these attitudes.  
The interpersonal impact of the disorder is devastating and profound, leading to experiences of 
KLJKHPRWLRQDOVWUDLQIHHOLQJVRIµFRQFHUQGHVSDLUIUXVWUDWLRQDQJHUFRQIXVLRQDQGJXLOW¶, where 
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difficulties in coping can cause nervous and physical breakdown.67  Holding the individual with an 
eating disorder culpable for her insensitivity to moral reasons seems wrong, both from a 
phenomenological and normative perspective.  Not only do family members almost always excuse 
such a person from moral criticism, such a response strikes one as appropriate.68   
In recent works, Scanlon admits that the conclusions of his contractualism are 
counterintuitive.  He argues in response for a notion of blame that is relationally bound and 
conceptually removed from punitive feelings, reflecting instead the expectations, intentions, and 
attitudes constitutive of RQH¶V UHODWLRQVKLSV  Blame implies blameworthiness, and sanctions the 
PRGLILFDWLRQ RI RXU UHODWLRQVKLSV WR DQRWKHU µin a way that this judgment of impaired relations 
KROGV WR EH DSSURSULDWH¶69  Scanlon seeks to capture how relationships consist of internal 
normative standards which warrant treatment of each other in certain ways, and precipitate 
differential responses of blame when these standards are violated.  The added benefit of rendering 
personal control as irrelevant to blame is that metaphysical debates about compatibilism and 
incompatibilism are neatly avoided.70  Thus blame can be attributed to the severely anorexic 
individual for violating standards within a particular relationship; modifying the relationship is 
warranted, though certain non-punitive attitudes ± like µV\PSDWK\DQGDVSHFLDOUHDGLQHVVWRKHOS
>KHU@LQVRPHZD\V¶71 ± are also appropriate.  Scanlon¶V account of blame might not absolve those 
individuals who lack control, yet arguably reflects the intuition that personal circumstances and 
the relational context should bear on the nature and intensity of our blaming responses. 
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Scanlon thus appears to succeed where Darwall could not: his account of blame seems to 
strike a balance between the non-differential treatment of individuals with impairments whilst 
recognising how personal and relational factors mediate issues of moral accountability.  Yet 
whether Scanlon can fully sever the contractualist link between competency and respect for 
dignity is questionable, as his discussion of psychopathy illustrates.  As mentioned earlier, the 
disorders of anorexia nervosa and psychopathy are non-equivalent, though certain parallels are 
noteworthy, such as the high degrees of procedural means-end reasoning, the negative impact of 
these conditions on relationships and friendships, and impaired responsiveness to moral reasons.  
Scanlon states WKDW EHFDXVH WKH SV\FKRSDWK µlack[s] the capacity to understand and respond to 
moral requirements it is questionable whether they can be participants in the moral relationship.¶
+H OLNHQV WKHP WR µ\RXQJ FKLOGUHQ¶ LQ WKDW µboth are and are not members of the moral 
community¶ DQG DUH RZHG µsome kinds of moral concern and care.¶  &UXFLDOO\ µthey are not 
candidates for relations of cooperation or trust, so withholding these relationships is not a 
modification of a status they would have had, were it not for certain particular instances of 
behavior and attitude.¶72  This sounds noticeably similaUWR'DUZDOO¶VMXVWLILFDWLRQIRUGLIIHUHQWLDO
treatment of individuals based on their psychological capacities.  If the psychopath were ineligible 
to enter into relationships of cooperation and trust, the same fate would likely apply to the severely 
anorexic individual given their overlapping characteristics.  Modification of an impaired 
relationship already presupposes the existence of mutual psychological and moral competencies ± 
without these, one is already partially excluded, not just from the moral community, but from 
certain ways of relating to each other, such as cooperation and trust.  Even in cases where Scanlon 
reaches the intuitively plausible conclusion that certain psychological incapacities will disqualify 
blameworthiness ± particularly where PHQWDOLOOQHVVPHDQVµDSHUVRQLVXQDEOHWRXQGHUVWDQGDQG
DVVHVVUHDVRQVRUKLVMXGJPHQWVKDYHQRHIIHFWRQKLVDFWLRQV¶73 ± what is owed to these individuals 
still falls short of respect.  SXFK DQ LQGLYLGXDO µFDQQRW EH D SDUWLFLSDQW LQ D V\VWHP RI co-
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GHOLEHUDWLRQDQGPXVWEHVHHQDVVLPSO\DIRUFHWREHGHDOWZLWKOLNHDQDQLPDO¶74  Contractual 
and deliberative respect presupposes one is responsible and subject to moral criticism.  
Conversely, individuals whose conditions impede their ability to understand and assess reasons 
and judgements ± such as psychopathy or severe anorexia nervosa ± are not owed deliberative 
respect.   
Initially, 6FDQORQ¶V ZLGH-scope of eligible contracting parties might not make this 
challenge decisive.  Like in Darwall, trustees can be used to represent and articulate the views of 
those with rational and moral incapacities.  Scanlon himself remarks WKDW LW LV µH[WUHPHO\
LPSODXVLEOH¶WRFRQFOXGHWKDWthose who fall short of the capacity to observe moral constraints or 
confeU UHFLSURFDOEHQHILW RQ RWKHU SDUWLFLSDQWV µIDOO RXWVLGH WKH SURWHFWLRQ RI PRUDOLW\¶75  Moral 
motivation is grounded on the fact that we have a desire to justify ourselves to others in 
accordance with the standard of reasonable rejection.76  6FDQORQ VWDWHV µWKH DEVHQFH RI WKHVH
capacities alone does nothing to undermine the possibility of justification to a being.  What it may 
do in some cases, however, is to alter the justifications ZKLFK DUH UHOHYDQW¶77  6FDQORQ¶V PRUH
inclusive criterion RI µKDYLQJ D SRLQW RI YLHZ¶ PDNHV WKLV D OHJLWLPDWH theoretical move which 
remains unavailable to Darwall.    
But FRQYLQFHVRPHDVWKLVPD\6FDQORQ¶Vaccount of blame still distorts what is owed to 
individuals lacking control and moral competence.  For Scanlon, modifications occur in different 
ways depending on the relationship, and include withholding trust and reliance, breaking off 
IULHQGVKLS RU FRRSHUDWLYH UHODWLRQV DOWHULQJ WKH PHDQLQJ DVVLJQHG WR DQRWKHU¶V DFWLRQV DQG RXU
interactions.78  Depriving another person these things is justifiable because these are not 
unconditional claims: µ>Z@HGRQRWRZHLWWRDQ\RQHWRWUXVWKLPRUEHKLVIULHQGQRPDWWHUKRZKH
treats us, or to value or take seriously conversation with him no matter what reasons guide his 
decisions about what to say, or to take pleasure in his well-being no matter what his attitude may 
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be toward others.¶79  Quite understandably, Scanlon discourages individuals from unwisely 
entering into relationships premised on non-reciprocity and unconditional acceptance on either 
side.  On the flip side, such relationships where modification is appropriate must be premised on 
contractualist conditions.  Cooperative relations presume D SHUVRQ¶V ability to understand the 
standards of the relationship in the first place.  The desirable things in relationships, such as trust, 
serious dialogical engagement, sympathetic concern, require mutuality that is premised on some 
form of psychological competence DV µWKHVH DWWLWXGHV DUH DSSURSULDWH only toward those whose 
attitude makes them appropriate¶80  Withholding these attitudes requires no further justification 
other than these things are not unconditionally owed to anyone.  But in articulating what we GRQ¶W
owe to people in this manner, Scanlon risks distorting our ethical obligations in cases of 
psychological impairment, inequality, and dependency. 
%ULHIO\ H[SORULQJ 6FDQORQ¶V WKHRU\ LV LQVWUXFWLYH, as despite a more catholic approach 
towards the competency condition, his framework, like Darwall¶V, would not necessarily rule out 
the differential treatment of E based on her psychological incapacities.  Both contractualist 
theories require considerable philosophical manoeuvring in order to capture the intuition that 
second-personal respect is owed to individuals with impairments.  Whether we find these 
endeavours convincing or unconvincing is ultimately beside the point ± more significant is the 
how its starting premises are too limited to capture fully aspects of our moral engagement and 




Both Darwall and Scanlon reveal how Kantian contractualism has a tendency to pull into 
two separate directions ± one towards a deeply egalitarian and cosmopolitan aspiration, which 
explains why human value and dignity is so frequently associated with the faculty of moral choice 
and responsibility.  The other pulls towards an exclusionary direction ± the reality is that many 
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will lack the capacity to realise this type of agency.  Working from the theory to practice, the 
moral and rational capacities constitutive of second-personal competence means that many 
individuals with impaired psychological capacities lack the second-personal authority required to 
demand respect for their choices and values.  Conversely, working from the phenomena to the 
theory, the case of E provides an unsettling example of when second-personal respect becomes 
moored to psychological capacities, suggesting we need to reconsider how the spheres of rational 
care and respect intersect theoretically.   
This challenge can be met in two ways.  First, the competency conditions of respect could 
be expanded or done away with altogether.  This, however, is not a fruitful strategy, as 
demonstrated by 6FDQORQ¶VPRUHFDWKROLFDSSURDFK$OWHUQDWLYHO\WKHFRPSHWHQFy criteria could 
be formulated differently through a phenomenological-normative account to better support the D1 
thesis and accommodate the second-personal dynamic between individuals with impairments and 
others.  Respect and care are reciprocally embedded in what I call hermeneutic competence, of 
which is situated within a recognitional but non-contractualist framework that is grounded on 
compassionate motivational resources, rather than demands for reciprocity and mutual 
accountability.  Phenomenological accounts of the moral demand, compassionate regard, and 
dialogical ability help gesture towards more promising ways to articulate how second-personal 
respect and deliberative recognition is owed to individuals who lack the psychological capacities 
to enter into relations of full moral responsibility and mutuality.  Here the ethical focus remains on 
the moral expertise and virtue of the individual who is on the receiving end of an ethical summons.  
Whilst I do not pretend that my response is as nearly developed as Darwall, it takes inspiration 
from the Aristotelian, virtue ethics tradition, where the embodied practices and intuitions in 
everyday ethical interaction have moral significance.  
Hermeneutic competence refers to a particular form of receptivity and moral attunement 
necessary to attend appropriately to the summons of another individual when one is situated within 
asymmetrical ethical relations, such as that which is articulated by /HYLQDV¶s ethics of alterity.  
Though 'DUZDOO¶VDQG/HYLQDV¶VDFFRXQWboth overlap in the way that morality and its demands 
are situated within the second-personal context, the latter¶s asymmetrical, non-reciprocal 
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framework leads to a more nuanced account of moral obligation and responsibility.  For Levinas, 
the summons of another triggers recognition of their inherent vulnerability and fragility ± what he 
FDOOVµWKH)DFH¶UHYHDOLQJDQ ethical responsibility that is unilateral and categorical.  µ7KHUHODWion 
WR WKH)DFH¶ZULWHV/HYLQDV µLVERWK WKHUHODWLRQ WR WKHDEVROXWHO\ZHDN ± to what is absolutely 
exposed, what is bare and destitute, the relation with bareness and consequently with what is alone 
DQGFDQXQGHUJRWKHVXSUHPHLVRODWLRQZHFDOOGHDWK¶81  In this encounter the I is summoned by 
WKHµUHDOFRQFUHWHSUHVHQFH¶82 of the Other which binds me to a categorical ethical demand to be 
responsible for and non-indifferent to the Other ± essentially a demand for me to recognise her as a 
separate but vulnerable being.  The ethically significant moment of this encounter is not when a 
verbal expression of a demand is issued, but prior to that ± WKH SDVVLYH UHFHSWLRQ RI DQRWKHU¶V
vulnerability and the moral demand that results.  Responsibility on my part is therefore present 
irrespective of the conditions of psychological competence and reciprocity being met. 
Crucially, exposure to the Other¶V IUDLOW\ LQ WKLV ZD\ entails her elevated rather than 
subordinate position in relation to the self.  This seems counterintuitive at first.  Its plausibility is 
clear, however, once we probe the nature of responsibility in conditions of asymmetry.  A mother 
caring for her severely disabled child is aware that she herself is responsible, without any 
expectation of reWXUQ7KHYXOQHUDELOLW\DQGIUDJLOLW\RIWKHFKLOG¶VHPERGLHGH[LVWHQFHLVH[SRVHG
LQ HYHU\ LQWHUDFWLRQ UHYHDOLQJ KHU PRWKHU¶V FDWHJRULFDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WR DQG IRU KHU  7KH
unilateral, unremitting bindingness of this obligation suggests that this child does indeed have an 
elevated SRVLWLRQ WR WKDWRIKHUPRWKHU LQWKHVHQVH WKDWµJRRGQHVVFRQVLVWVLQSODFLQJP\VHOILQ
EHLQJLQVXFKDZD\WKDWWKH2WKHUZRXOGFRXQWPRUHWKDQPH¶83  Even deeper, when one sees the 
utter dependence and vulnerability of an individual, its impact inspires a certain awe and humility 
that is entirely separate from their faculties of moral choice, as captured LQ (YD )HGHU .LWWD\¶V
moving description of her relationship with her severely disabled daughter, Sesha, for example: 
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She was so vulnerable.  She would need so much protection and love from us to shelter 
her from the scorn of the world, from its dangers, from its indifference, from its failure to 
XQGHUVWDQGKHUDQGKHUKXPDQLW\:HGLGQ¶WUHDOL]HKRZPXFKVKHZRXOGWHDFKXs, but we 
already knew that we had learned something.  That which we believed we valued, what we 
± I ± thought was at the center of humanity, the capacity for thought, for reason, was not it, 
not it at all.84 
 
Importantly, a demand to rectify the moral asymmetry would be an inappropriate ethical 
reaction,85 for the relational structure enjoins me to respond out of pure generosity to the Other, 
independently of how the other responds to me.  This is why coming into the concrete presence of 
an Other involves transcendence of the self and ego.  To be purely generous means to forget the 
self in giving to another.  
This Levinasian framework reveals two things about the second-person standpoint and its 
attendant obligations.  Firstly, a non-reciprocal relational structure can generate unilateral moral 
responsibilities: this asymmetry as such does not reflect the status or capabilities of either 
individual, nor the actual encounter or mode of engagement.86  Secondly, moral responsibility is 
instigated by an exposure to, and recognition of, human frailty, and is accompanied by a dual 
experience of humility and awe.  As Kittay¶VZRUGV reveal, the Kantian contractualist focus on the 
faculty for rational and moral agency as a source of respect and dignity fails to appreciate the full 
moral significance of our responsiveness to fragility.  At a pre-reflective level ± before I even ask 
myself what I ought to do ± an ethical summons for Levinas does not distinguish between respect 
and care.87  This Levinasian framework by itself, however, cannot provide concrete normative 
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content in terms of how one can be simultaneously responsive to the fact of human vulnerability 
DQG UHVSHFWIXO RI DQRWKHU¶V FRUH DOWHULW\ DQG LQGHSHQGHQFH.  Hermeneutic competence requires 
additional motivational resources WR PHGLDWH RQH¶V ethical response, specifically compassionate 
regard and dialogical openness.  
Compassionate regard88 is the emotional core motivating the redirection of our attention 
towards another and their condition or state, and incorporates µHXGDLPRQLVWLFHYDOXDWLRQ¶whereby 
DQRWKHU¶V IORXULVKLQJ H[WHQGV the boundaries of our self-regard.89  Cognitive appraisals in the 
following ways constitute appropriately directed compassionate regard L WKH GHSWK RU µVL]H¶ RI
suffering; ii) the removal of culpability and recognition that goods necessary for flourishing are 
vulnerable to forces outside our rational control; iii) eudaimonistic judgement where the suffering 
of another affects our own sense of flourishing.90  Compassionate regard therefore has both an 
agent-neutral and agent-relative dimension.  Such motivational resources are triggered by an 
objective DSSUHFLDWLRQ RI KXPDQLW\¶V IUDJLOH UHODWLRQVKLS WR JRRGQHVV DQG IORXULVKLQJ ± that its 
actualisation is not entirely down to our autonomous control.  But operating alongside such agent-
neutral appraisals is agent-relative, empathetic skills which recognise and respect the inherent 
separateness of another individual.  The second-personal standpoint has to be maintained; if we 
adopted a non-relational, third-personal perspective, this would prevent us from getting an 
DFFXUDWHVHQVHRIµVL]H¶)RUH[DPSOHDVVXPing that a pain in my hand is equivalent to that which 
prevents a violinist from playing is indicative of empathetic deficiencies.  Nussbaum states, 
µDZDUHQHVVRIRQH¶V VHSDUDWH OLIH LVTXLWH LPSRUWDQW LIHPSDWK\ LV WREH IRU another, and not for 
oneself, that one feels compassion, one must be aware both of the bad lot of the sufferer and of the 
IDFWWKDWLWLVULJKWQRZQRWRQH¶VRZQ¶91  Empathetic skills necessary for compassionate regard 
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recognises that I can never know the other as I assume to know myself; I cannot make the Other 
equivalent to myself or the whole.  ConsequentlyWKHµGLJQLW\RIWKHXQLTXH¶LVUHVSHFWHG92  
A comportment of dialogical openness must also accompany compassionate regard and its 
attendant empathic skills.  Hermeneutically competent agents recognise every standpoint is 
constituted by a range of implicit and explicit prejudices which function as an inescapable 
perspectival orientation.  Dialogical openness in intersubjective engagement entails genuine 
understanding rather than mutual consensus ± ZKDW *DGDPHU KDV FKDUDFWHULVHG DV D µIXVLRQ RI
KRUL]RQV¶  This vision of two separately existing horizons converging through agreement is 
somewhat misleading.  As a heuristic device, however, it helps articulate the critical moment when 
our prejudicial horizon is violated by something alien to us ± ZKHQDQRWKHUµDGGUHVVHV XV¶RUZH
DUHµDZDNHQHGWRVRPHWKLQJ¶, faced with our own limitations, and our understanding is enriched as 
a result.93  3HJJ\6HVKD¶VFDUHUHORTXHQWO\GHVFULEHVWhis process: 
 
I was working on some walking exercises that the folks at [the medical centre] had 
assigned.  I was working terribly hard trying to get Sesha to cooperate and do what I was 
supposed to get her to do.  >«@I thought, how am I going to do this?  How can I possibly 
do this job, when I looked down at Sesha and saw her little head pushed back against her 
VWUROOHUPRYLQJILUVWWRRQHVLGHDQGWKHQWRDQRWKHU ,FRXOGQ¶WILJXUHRXWZKDWVKHZDV
doing.  Until I traced what her eyes were fixed on.  She had spotted a leave falling, and she 
was following its descent  , VDLG³7KDQN\RX IRUEHLQJP\ WHDFKHU6HVKD  , VHHQRZ
1RWP\ZD\<RXUZD\6ORZO\´$IWHUWKDW,IXOO\JDYHP\VHOIRYHUWR6HVKD94 
 
This vignette illustrates how a fusion of horizons occurs when our initial experience of alienation 
from the Other is overcome, so what was alien is now viewed as one of many possibilities.  That 
particular possibility may have eluded us initially, but we now see its value µbetter, within a larger 
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ZKROHDQGLQWUXHUSURSRUWLRQ¶95  Such potential enrichment of our XQGHUVWDQGLQJLVQ¶WDYDLODEOHWR
the individual who tries to prove herself right or impose her own view on a situation.  Dialogical 
openness as a constituent of hermeneutic competence may involve conversational skills which 
enables one to develop an underVWDQGLQJ DQG UHFRJQLWLRQ RI D SDUWLFXODU LQGLYLGXDO¶V LQWHUHVWV
feelings, and so on, or, as in the case of 3HJJ\¶VUHODWLRQVKLSWR6HVKDJURZLQJDZDUHQHVVRIWKH 
VDOLHQFHRIWKH2WKHU¶VSHUFHSWLRQ± ZKDWVRPHKDYHUHIHUUHGWRDVDFTXLULQJµMRLQWDWWHQWLRQ¶96   
Moving away from the contractualist focus on mutuality and reciprocity as necessary for 
respect makes this account better able to support the D1 thesis.  As an amalgam of compassionate 
regard and dialogical openness, hermeneutic competence rHYHDOV KRZ UHFRJQLWLRQ RI DQRWKHU¶V
independence and radical alterity is not always coextensive with respect for subjective choice.  
Rather, it articulates a particular manner of respectful engagement with an individual which, 
sometimes but not always, implies respecting those very choices.  UQOLNH 'DUZDOO¶V DFFRXQW RI
rational care, agent-neutral, welfare-UHJDUGLQJ GHOLEHUDWLRQ GRHVQ¶W PRWLYDWH hermeneutic 
competence.  Even as it is situated in an objective understanding about the vulnerability of our 
goods, the motivational impetus remains rooted in the second-personal dimension of 
compassionate regard ± the sense that DQRWKHU¶VIORXULVKLQJ LPSDFWVRQPLQH 7KHUHFRJQLWLRQDO
core within empathic and dialogical skills further expresses a way of valuing individuals with 
deliberative respect when they express their demands.  An agent-relative stance towards the 
another implies that I do not subsume their needs and voice under mine or assume an objectivising 
gaze in the form of third-personal reasoning, regardless of possible deficits in the DQRWKHU¶s 
psychological capacities.  Faced with their psychological deficiencies, my orientation towards 
them is informed by, not that particular reality, but a stance of humility and willingness to learn; I 
cannot automatically assume I know better what is their good, more than they know it themselves.  
Since second-personal recognition of another is not bound to the capacity for moral agency and 
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choice, the basis of respect ± and our expression of it towards another ± shifts accordingly.  The 
normative focus moves towards the competency and its motivational constituents of the individual 
on the receiving end of an ethical summons in the second-personal context; it demands the 
development of its constituent skills and eventual expertise through lived experience and repeated 
practice, with the aim of extending the boundaries of moral concern encircling the individual 
through the appropriate exercise of compassionate and dialogical mechanisms.97  
One possible objection might be that the motivational and evaluative basis of hermeneutic 
competence amounts to a humiliating and paternalistic way of valuing an individual.  Why 
Darwall and other contemporary Kantians emphasise the reciprocal and contractualist structure 
XQGHUO\LQJ UHVSHFW IRU RQH¶V GLJQLW\ DQG DXWRQRP\ is understandable.  Motivating this move 
historically are laudable egalitarian and universalist commitments as well as worries that 
acknowledging the constitutive role of vulnerable external goods in flourishing concedes too much 
of our dignity to luck.  From that perspective, compassionate regard has, at best an uneasy 
relationship to respect; at worst, it humiliates the moral worth of the individual who is its object.98  
However, compassion, like Kantian respect, has at its basis the thought of common humanity.  
Respect for dignity must escape this theoretical preoccupation with our moral faculties so as to 
attend to both the fragile nature of autonomous agency and the external goods necessary to 
develop and promote its constitutive capacities.  Because compassionate regard takes this as its 
starting point, it is in fact better positioned to respect those with psychological impairments and 
guard against their paternalistic or humiliating treatment.  And should the worry persist, the 
conditions of empathetic skill and dialogical openness function as checks against condescending 
impulses. 
Doubts as to whether this approach can provide principled guidance that is applicable to 
clinical and legal practice might be assuaged when we extend this discussion back to the case of E.  
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The Levinasian relational structure of asymmetry and non-reciprocal responsibility accurately 
FDSWXUHV (¶V UHODWLRQVKLSV ZLWK RWKHU SDUWLHV  In their support for her refusal of treatment, (¶V
family and carers demonstrate the type of hermeneutic competence I have been defending.  
Notably, the judge had not met with E, and the court-appointed court expert had met with her only 
once.99  (YHQDV LW LVGRXEWIXO WKDW(¶VFODLPVH[SUHVV second-SHUVRQDOFRPSHWHQFH LQ'DUZDOO¶V
sense, the compassionate regard of her advocates drew attention to the moral salience of her 
suffering and the importance of autonomous control to her in the given circumstances.100  Their 
efforts to UHVSHFW(¶VLQGHSHQGHQFHLQVSLWHRIKHUDSSDUHQWODFNRIVHFRQG-personal competence is 
a reflection of their FRPSHWHQFH WKHLU DFFHSWDQFHRI(¶V DOWHULW\ LV H[SUHVVHG LQ WKHLUGLDORJLFDO
attunement to her own unique voice in the given situational context, even if it means setting aside 
their own preconceived judgements.  (¶VSDUHQWVVWDWHG 
 
[W]e have watched our daughter preparing for her death in a very dignified and considered 
way, with a powerful sense of control over her situation.  In this time, she has never faltered 
from her wish not to be re-fed.  
 
It upsets us greatly to advocate for our daughter's right to die.  We love her dearly but feel 
that our role should now be to fight for her best interests, which, at this time, we strongly feel 
should be the right to choose her own pathway, free from restraint and fear of enforced re-
feed.  We feel that she has suffered enough.  She stands no hope of achieving the things that 
she would value in her life and shows no signs of revising these aspirations.  We would plead 
for E to have some control over what would be the last phase of her life, something she has 
been denied for many years.  >«]  We want her to be able to die with dignity in safe, warm 
surroundings with those that love her.101 
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This perspective illustrates how care and respect should be integrated within a best interest 
decision.  (¶V FDUHUV DQG DGYRFDWHV QHYHU PRYH DZD\ IURP WKH VHFRQG-personal, relational 
perspective which is to recognise the truth of her particular experience of suffering, thus ensuring 
that her uniqueness and independence is heard and respected regardless of whether she can 
reciprocate in a free and reasonable manner, and whether she is their equal in moral 
responsibility and competence.  This illustrates how respectful engagement with an incapacitated 
agent is orientated around dialogical skilfulness and compassionate regard as constituents of 
hermeneutic competence, striking an important balance between the undesirable extremes of 
intrusive, XQQHFHVVDU\ SDWHUQDOLVWLF LQWHUYHQWLRQ DQG µD VKRXOGHU-VKUXJJLQJ LQGLIIHUHQFH¶102 to an 
LQFRPSHWHQWSDWLHQW¶VSRWHQWLDOO\KDUPIXOGHFLVLRQ 
This paper has three important practical implications.  First, hermeneutic competence 
clarifies the ethical obligations of best interest decision-making under the MCA, and ensures that 
the unique voice of the patient is fundamental to the determination of what is her good.  The 
statutory requirements of best interest decision-making under the MCA are significant precisely in 
its normative intention to make the incapacitated patient central to the actual decision-making 
process.  Occupying a middle ground between traditional objectivist and substituted judgement 
standards, the MCA formally endorses a participatory model which stresses the importance of 
patient consultation and the consideration of past and present feelings, wishes, beliefs, and 
values.103  HH Judge Marshall QC argued,  
 
Given the policy of the Act to empower people to make their own decisions wherever 
SRVVLEOHMXVWLILFDWLRQIRURYHUUXOLQJ3DQGVDYLQJKLPIURPKLPVHOIPXVW>«@EHVWURng and 
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cogent.  Otherwise, taking a different course from that which P wishes would be likely to 
infringe the statutory direction in s [1(6)] of the Act >«@104 
 
Although it is true that the best interests approach in the MCA is ambiguous enough to 
accommodate different statutory intentions105, a recent Supreme Court ruling106 clearly tips the 
balance away from an objectivist test towards the participatory model.  Lady Hale explicitly 
disagreed with the suggestion that the WHVWRIDSDWLHQW¶VZLVKHVDQGIHHOLQJVLVDQREMHFWLYHRQH, 
µZKDWWKHUHDVRQDEOHSDWLHQWZRXOGWKLQN¶.  She stated:  
 
7KHSXUSRVHRIWKHEHVWLQWHUHVWVWHVWLVWRFRQVLGHUPDWWHUVIURPWKHSDWLHQW¶VSRLQWRIYLHZ
That is not to say that his wishes must prevail, any more than those of a fully capable patient 
must prevail.  >«]  %XWLQVRIDUDVLWLVSRVVLEOHWRDVFHUWDLQWKHSDWLHQW¶VZLVKHVDQGIHHOLQJV
his beliefs and values or the things which were important to him, it is those which should be 
taken into account because they are a component in making the choice which is right for him 
as an individual human being.107 
 
This participatory ideal, however, has been realised imperfectly to date, leading to my 
second point.  Analysis RI'DUZDOO¶VGLYLVLRQEHWZHen second-personal respect and rational care 
helps focus our critical attention to an implicit bias towards traditional models of best-interest 
decision-making in current judicial practice.  A traditional best interests approach enshrines 
beneficence and oEMHFWLYLW\WRZDUGVWKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIDSDWLHQW¶VZHOIDUHZKHUHDVVXEVWLWXWHG
judgement requires a surrogate to make decisions in accordance with what a patient herself would 
have wanted if she had decisional capacity.  Either way, both approaches are inclined to minimise 
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the voice of the incapacitated patient herself108 and sanction paternalistic intervention with 
nominal patient consultation.109  TKH 0&$¶V FRUH SULQFLSOH RI SDWLHQW SDUWLFLSDWLRQ KDV EHHQ
LQWHUSUHWHGDVFRQWLQJHQWRQ µWKHFDUHIXO MXGJPHQW¶ RI µWKHGHFLVLRQPDNHU >ZKRGHWHUPLQHV@ WKH
extent to which an LQFDSDFLWDWHGSHUVRQFDQSDUWLFLSDWHLQGHFLVLRQVDERXWWKHLUZHOIDUH¶)XUWKHU
WKHUDQJHRISDUWLFLSDWLRQPD\YDU\GHSHQGLQJRQWKHIDFWVRIWKHFDVHDQGµwhether the person has 
responsibility for making and living with the consequences of any decision which they choose to 
PDNH¶110  LLNHLQ'DUZDOO¶VWKHRU\PRUHSDUWLFLSDWLRQLPSOLHVRQHKDVWKHFDSDFLW\WRHQWHULQWR
mutual relations of moral responsibility.  This understanding of the MCA is more common than 
not in judicial determinations of best interests: non-participation of the patient is not only the 
SUDFWLFDOUHDOLW\EXW LV WKRXJKWRIDVD OHJLWLPDWH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI WKHVWDWXWH¶VQRUPDWLYH LQWHQW
Yet we need to challenge this assumption should we wish to avoid reducing the participatory ideal 
of best interest decision-making to mere tokenistic gestures at best.  The starting point for best 
interests decision-making requires at least some dialogical engagement with the patient. 
Finally, my discussion above could be seen to accord with arguments which claim that 
tests of capacity and substituted decision-making mechanisms are discriminatory under the 
CRPD.111  The usefulness of the concept of capacity is itself uncertain.  Combined with the 
debatable use of inherent jurisdiction to override the choices of individuals who formally pass the 
capacity test, one could argue that jurists have inadvertently distorted the distinction between 
capacity and incapacity, whilst moving towards an increasingly paternalistic and interventionist 
direction.112  Under the CRPD universal legal capacity implies any form of substituted judgement 
is impermissible; mechanisms for supported decision-making are required instead.113  Much has to 
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be explored in terms of how these supportive mechanisms are to be provided.  The ethical 
reorientation implicit in these developments is nonetheless welcome, as the evaluative focus 
moves away from the competencies of the individual in question, towards those of her surrounding 




This paper has ZRUNHGEDFNDQGIRUWKIURP'DUZDOO¶VWKHRU\DQGMXGLFLDOSUDFWLFHLQRUGHU
WRPDNHFRQFHSWXDO VSDFH IRU WKH FDWHJRULFDOREOLJDWLRQ WR UHVSHFW DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶VXQLTXHYRLFH
even in relationships of asymmetrical responsibility and unequal capacities.  Whilst 'DUZDOO¶V
theory of the second-person standpoint is both timely and important from a theoretical standpoint, 
the presuppositions of his contractualist framework cannot comfortably accommodate the intuition 
that second-personal respect is owed to individuals with impaired psychological competencies.  
My analysis of hermeneutic competence has not been exhaustive but gestures towards important 
areas requiring further critical attention.  Firstly, my alternative account challenges the connection 
between differential treatment and psychological competencies which validates the paternalistic 
but well-meaning disrespect of persons in both theory and practice.  Secondly, it provides better 
normative grounding for WKH 0&$¶V SDUWLFLSDWRU\ PRGHO RI EHVW LQWHUHVW GHFLVLRQ-making.  
Numerous worrying incidents of systemic neglect and intervention in the care of incapacitous 
patients should make us wary of VHWWLQJDVLGHUHVSHFWIRUDSHUVRQ¶VXQLTXHYRLFHLQZHOO-meaning 
but unwarranted paternalistic care. 
